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THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY: IS IT ATTACKING
PEOPLE THAT WERE NOT MEANT TO BE A PART OF
THE LAW?
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent holding in Doe v. Attorney General ("Doe(I)"),'
has left the fate of the Sex Offender Registry Act unknown. In a
unanimous decision, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
held that the law dealing with low-risk offenders was unconstitutional.2 This comment will discuss the development of the law and
its applicability to low-risk offenders. The recent argument that the
sex offender registry act is overinclusive, and therefore unconstitutional to low-risk offenders, has left many wondering about the
status of the current law.3
This comment will focus on the Massachusetts Sex Offender
Registry Act and how it applies to sex offenders. Section IIA of this
comment discusses how Megan's law, which requires the registration
of sex offenders with local authorities, came into existence.4 Section
IIB of this comment explains the implementation of Megan's law in
Massachusetts and its application to sex offenders Section IIC explains how sex offenders' due process rights are affected by Megan's
law.6 Section lID sets forth the relevant Massachusetts case law and
statutes that have further defined the sex offender registry.7 Section

2

No. 07481, 1997 WL 70985 (Mass. Nov. 17, 1997).
See id. (holding all low-risk offenders must be granted hearing to argue

against inclusion into registry).
' See infra note 106 and accompanying text (indicating recent holding has
weakened sex offender registry).
' See infra notes 11- 15 and accompanying text (explaining why Megan's
law was initiated).
' See infra notes 16- 22 and accompanying text (introducing how Megan's
law applies to sex offenders in Massachusetts).
6 See infra notes 23- 36 and accompanying text (discussing violation
of
sex offenders' constitutional rights).
' See infra notes 37- 104 and accompanying text (illustrating shift in
existing sex offender registry).
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III provides an analysis of current case law.8 Finally, in section IV,
this comment concludes that recent case law has left the sex offender
registry in an unworkable state. 9 The holding that the sex offender
registry was unconstitutional as applied to the lowest level offenders
has opened the floodgates for more than thirteen thousand new
hearings for level one offenders.'°
II. HISTORY
A. Introduction to Megan's Law
On July 29, 1994, Megan Kanka, a seven year old New Jersey
girl, was sexually assaulted and then strangled to death. 1 This tragedy received national attention when the public learned the offender,
Jesse Timmendequas, was a convicted pedophile. 2 This convicted
sex offender had moved directly across the street from the Kanka
family without any warning.' 3 The public's fury over this avoidable
tragedy led to the implementation of a community notification plan
on both a state and federal level. 14 As a result of the federal govern-

8 See infra notes 105-119 and accompanying text (discussing how current
case law affects sex offender registry).
9 See infra note 106 and accompanying text (concluding sex offender
registry needs to be revamped).
'o See infra note 107 and accompanying text (acknowledging loophole in
sex offender registry).
" See James Popkin et al., Natural Born Predators,U.S. NEWS & WORLD

REP., Sept. 19, 1994 (addressing public's anger over known sex offenders within
their communities).
2

See id., (acknowledging public's outrage when Jesse Timmendequas

and two other known sex offenders moved into Hamilton township).
13 See id. (highlighting facts of the Kanka's tragedy).
"4
See Ivette Mendez, Sex Offender Bills Enacted by Whitman, STAR
LEDGER, Nov. 1, 1994 (announcing community notification provisions Governor
Whitman signed); see also Jacob Wetterling, Crimes Against Children and
Sexually Violent Offender Registration Program Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (West
1997) (establishing guidelines for persons convicted of sexual offenses).
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ment's adoption of a community notification plan, every state has
adopted some form of " Megan's Law."' 5

"5 See Jacob Wetterling, Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent
Offender Registration Program Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (encouraging states to
enact sex offender registration and community notification laws in order to
maintain the level of federal funding for crime control). Presently, all states have
passed some form of child sex offender registration laws: Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, West Virginia and Wyoming. ALA. CODE §
13A-11-200 (1996); ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.56.840, 12.63.010 (Michie 1997);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3821 (1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-902 to -906
(1997); CAL. PENAL CODE § 290-290.4 (West 1998); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 18-3-412.5 (WEST 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 54-102a to -102b
(West 1996); DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 11, §4120 (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
775.13- .21 (West 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (1998); 1995 Haw. Sess.
Laws 160; IDAHO CODE § 18- 8301 to -8311 (1997); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 150/1- 10 (West 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-12-4 to -13 (West 1997);
1995 Iowa Legis. Serv. 146 (West); KAN. STAT. ANN. §22-4901 to -4910
(1997); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.500- .540 (Banks- Baldwin 1997); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 540- 549 (West 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 34-A,
§ 11001- 11005 (West 1997); 1995 Md. Laws 142; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6,
§§ 178C- 1780 (1997); 1994 Mich. Pub. Acts 295; MINN. STAT. ANN. §
243.166 (West 1997); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-1 to -19 (1997); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 589.400 (West 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-501 to -507; NEB.
REV. STAT. § 29-4001 to -4013; 1997 Nev. Stat. 377; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 651-B; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 to -11 (West 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
29-1IA-1 to -8 (Michie 1997); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 168-a to 168- t
(McKinney 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.5 to .10 (1997); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-32-15; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.01 to -. 10 (Baldwin
1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57 §§ 581-587; 1997 Or. Laws 538; 1995 Pa.
Laws 24; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37.1-1 to §11-37.1-16; 1998 S.C. Acts 384; S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-22-30 to -41 (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4039-101 to -108 (1997); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13c.1
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B. Megan's Law in Massachusetts
On July 31,1996, Massachusetts enacted legislation (the "Act),
a form of "Megan's Law," addressing repeat sex offenders.' 6 The
sex offender registry board, a subdivision of the criminal history
systems board (the "Board"), established and maintained a computerized registry of all sex offenders." The Board adopted both registration and community notification schemes to allow a person to request sex offender information about a particular person or geographic area."8 The Act requires that a sex offender must register, in

redesignated as art. 62.01; UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-21.5, 53-5-212.1
(1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 (1997); VA. CODE ANN. §19.2-298.1 to -302
(Michie 1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.24.550, 9A.44.130 to .140,
10.01.200 to .210, 70.48.470, 72.09.330 to .345 (West 1997); W. VA. CODE §
61-8F-I to -10; 1996 Wis. Legis. Serv. 440 (West); WYO. STAT. § 7-19-301 to 306 (1997).
,6MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, §§ 178C-1780 (1997) (enacting sex offender
registry).
17 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178D(a-e) (1997).
Section 178D(a-e)
provides that the file on each sex offender should include the following
information:
(a) the sex offender's name, aliases used, date and place of birth, sex,
race, height, weight, eye and hair color, social security number, home
address and work address; (b) a photograph and set of fingerprints; (c)
a description of the offense for which the sex offender was convicted
or adjudicated, the city or town where the offense occurred, the date of
conviction or adjudication and the sentence imposed; (d) any other information which may be useful in assessing the risk of the sex offender
to re offend; and (e) any other information which may be useful in
identifying the sex offender.

Id.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178J (1997) provides:
A person who requests sex offender registry information shall: (i) be
eighteen years of age or older; (ii) appear in person at a city or town
police station and present proper identification; (iii) state that he requests sex offender registry information for his own protection or for
the protection of a child under the age of eighteen or another person
for whom said inquirer has responsibility, care, or custody; and (iv)
18

1999]

THE SEX OFFENDERREGISTRY

person, at the local police department in the city or town where he
resides.' 9 This information is then transmitted to the Federal Bureau
of Investigation. 0 A sex offender's obligation to maintain accurate
registration information lasts for twenty years from the date of conviction or release, whichever is later.2 If the offender has committed
more than one sexual offense, the offender is obligated to register for
the rest of his life.22
C. How Sex Offenders' Due ProcessRights are
Affected by Megan's Law
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides that " [n]o state [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." 23 The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, in Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd.,24 held
that in order to satisfy due process requirements, the appropriateness
of an offender's risk classification must be proven.25 The Sex Offender Registry Bd. court reaffirmed that "sex offenders have a constitutionally protected liberty and privacy interest in avoiding registration and public dissemination of registration information." 2 6 In
complete and sign a record of inquiry, designed by the board, which
includes the following information: the name and address of the person
making the inquiry; the person or geographic area or street which is
the subject of the inquiry; the reason for the inquiry; and the date and
time of the inquiry.

Id.

,9 See

MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 6,

§ 178E (1997) (requiring sex offenders to

register).
20 See MASs. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178E (1997) (requiring transmitting of
information to appropriate offices).
2 See MASs. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178G (1997) (setting forth requirements

of registering).
22 See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, §178G (1997) (requiring registration for
life if offender has committed more than one offense).
21 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
14 428 Mass. 90, 697 N.E.2d
512 (1998).
25
See id. at 91, 697 N.E.2d at 513 (requiring hearing showing by

preponderance of evidence classification is correct).
26

Id. at 100, 697 N.E.2d at 515; see also Doe(]), 1997 WL 70985, at *6

(announcing level one offenders have constitutionally protected interests).
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this case, the two sex offenders were classified as level three offenders, the highest risk classification for offenders.27 The offenders
claimed that because the legislature did not provide for any evidentiary hearings in the statute to assess risk classification, the statute
was constitutionally defective.28 The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts held that inherent safeguards exist to show the appropriateness of the risk classification, and therefore the Act satisfies the
due process requirements under both the state and federal constitutions.29
In Roe v. Farwell,° the United States District Court was required to determine whether the application of the registration and
community notification requirements were overinclusive as applied
to the plaintiff." The sex offender there was a convicted rapist.32
The sex offender claimed the registration and public disclosure violated a number of his constitutional rights.33 The sex offender argued
that he should not have to register because he was not classified as 34
a
sexually dangerous person and did not pose a threat to children.
The Farwell court held "imperfections in the classification will not
constitute a violation of the equal protection clauses unless based on

27

Sex Offender Registry Bd., 428 Mass. at 96, 697 N.E.2d at 516.

See id. at 98, 697 N.E.2d at 516-17 (arguing absence of constitutionally
sufficient procedures makes statute defective).
29 See id. at 103, 697 N.E.2d at 520 (recognizing dual requirement of
detailed finding to demonstrate close attention has been given to classification
and preponderance of evidence standard satisfies due process).
'0999 F. Supp. 174 (D. Mass. 1998).
ld. at 194.
I'
Id. at 178. The sex offender's victim was a thirty-three year old female
employee of his company. Id. He subjected her to vaginal penetration with his
fingers and penis and performed cunnilingus on her. Id.
" Farwell, 999 F. Supp. at 174. The sex offender claimed that the
registration and disclosure requirements violated ex post facto, double jeopardy,
equal protection, and due process clauses of the constitution. Id. The court,
however, could not address the due process claim. Id.
14 See id. at 194 (arguing inclusion into registry should
only be for
sexually dangerous persons).
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invidious discrimination." 35 The court reasoned the mere fact that a
sex offender may not pose a threat to minors does not invalidate the
classification.36
D. MassachusettsStatutory and Case Law

Prior to the enactment of the community notification provisions
of the sex offender registry, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in the Opinion of the Justices to the Senate," assessed the

constitutionality of the Act.38 In this opinion, the Justices discussed
the purpose of the proposed legislation. 39 The stated purpose of the
proposed legislation was to "protect the public from the danger of
recidivism posed by sex offenders." 4 In evaluating the purpose, the
Justices' found that community notification schemes, along with information passed to law enforcement agencies, would further the
governments interest in protecting children and other vulnerable
people from harm.' In addition, the legislation defined what would

3 Farwell, 999 F. Supp. at 194.
36
See id. (recognizing classification rationally related to legitimate
governmental interest); but see Doe(]), 1997 WL 70985 (acknowledging right to
hearing to determine risk of reoffense).
" 423 Mass. 1201, 668 N.E.2d 738 (1996).
38 See id. (holding community notification provisions in proposed
legislation constitutional).
'9Id. at 1204, 668 N.E.2d at 739.
40 Id. The legislative purpose goes on to state that sex offender
registry is
offenders
by
also to "aid law enforcement officials in the apprehension of sex
providing the police with additional information critical to preventing sexual
victimization and to resolving incidents involving sexual abuse and exploitation."
Id.
,dSee id. (acknowledging purpose of bill would also bring Massachusetts
in compliance with Federal Crime Control Act); see also Opinion of the Justices,
423 Mass. at 1243, 668 N.E.2d at 761(Liacos, Paul J.) (emphasizing court has
commented only on certain portions of Bill); see also Jacob Wetterling, Crimes
Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Program Act, 42
U.S.C. § 14071 (West 1997) (announcing failure to implement certain provisions
of Act will result in failure to receive ten percent of funds otherwise granted).
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constitute a "sex offense." 4, 2 To keep the community abreast of sexual offenders, the proposed legislation developed a three-tier community notification scheme. 43 The three levels used for assessing
risk of recidivism, low, moderate, and high, would be determined by
considering certain information. Some of the factors used to determine the risk of reoffense include:

41

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178C (1997).

The definition of a "sex

offense" reads, in pertinent part:
[a]n indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen under the
provisions of section thirteen B of chapter two hundred and sixty -five;
indecent assault and battery on a mentally retarded person under the
provisions of section thirteen F of said chapter two hundred and sixtyfive; rape of a child under sixteen with force under the provisions of
section twenty-two A of chapter two hundred and sixty-five; rape and
abuse of a child under the provisions of section twenty-three of said
chapter two hundred and sixty-five; ... assault of a child under sixteen
with intent to commit rape under the provisions of section twenty four
B of chapter two hundred and sixty-five and sixty-five; .

.

. unnatural

and lascivious acts with a child under sixteen under the provisions of
section thirty-five A of chapter two hundred and seventy- two; or (B)
rape under the provisions of section twenty-two of chapter two hundred and sixty-five; assault with intent to commit rape under the provisions of section twenty- four of said chapter two hundred and sixtyfive; indecent assault and battery on a person who has obtained the age
of fourteen under the provisions of section thirteen H of said chapter
two hundred and sixty-five; or (C) kidnapping under the provisions of
section twenty-six of said chapter two hundred and sixty-five; including an attempt to commit a violation of any of the aforementioned
sections.
Id.; see also Opinion of the Justices, 423 Mass. at 1204, 668 N.E.2d at 740
(1996) (articulating what constitutes sex offense).
43 See Opinion of the Justices, 423 Mass. at 1228, 668 N.E.2d
at 753
(announcing three level notification scheme is to protect and guard against repeat
offenders); see also supra note 40 and accompanying text (reiterating sex
offender registry purpose is to protect public).
4

See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178K(l) (1997).

Section 178K(l)

provides, in pertinent part, "[tihe sex offender registry board shall promulgate
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whether the sex offender has a mental abnormality;
whether the sex offender's conduct is characterized by
repetitive and compulsive behavior; whether the offender committed a sex offense on a child; the age of
the sex offender at the time of the commission of the
first sex offense; and whether the sex offender served
the maximum term of incarceration.45
The Board would be responsible for determining the risk of recidivism of each sex offender.4 The Board developed three levels of
notification depending on the degree of risk of re-offense. 47 The first
level, level one, is given to a sex offender whose risk of re-offense is
low. 48 A level one classification only requires that the appropriate
information be passed on to the police departments and the Federal

guidelines for determining the level of risk of reoffense of sex offenders, apply
the guidelines to assess the risk level of particular offenders, develop guidelines
for use by city and town police departments in disseminating sex offender
registry information." Id.
41 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178K
(1) (a) (i-v) (1997).
46
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178K(1) (1997) (detailing who board
will consist of and length of term for each member).
41 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178K (1997) (listing guidelines used
to
assess risk of re-offense); see also supra note 45 and accompanying text
(reiterating factors relevant to determine risk of reoffense).
48 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178K(2)(a) (1997).
Section 178K(2)(a)
provides, in relevant part:
If the risk of re-offense is low, a level one designation shall be given to
the sex offender. In such case, the board shall transmit the registration
data to the police departments where the sex offender intends to live
and work and where the offense was committed and to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The public shall have access to information regarding level one offenders in accordance with the provisions of sections 1781 and 178J.
Id.; see supra note 18 and accompanying text (listing requirements of person
requesting sex offender information); see also infra note 75 and accompanying
text (announcing proper procedure to find out whether particular person is sex
offender).
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Bureau of Investigation.4 9 A level two classification is designated
when the risk of re-offense is moderate. ° A level two designation
requires that the police departments notify all youth groups in the
community, and any other group that may encounter the sex offender." Level two's more stringent standards of community notification are due to the greater risk of re-offense. A level three classification is given when the sex offender's risk of re-offense is high. 2
Level three offenders, similar to level two offenders, require a strict
community notification plan." Although the Board determines the
sex offender's level of risk, information such as victim impact statements, statements made by the offender himself, and a number of
other factors are considered when designating a classification.

See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178K(2)(a) (1997) (requiring less
stringent standards for level one designation). The file contains the sex offenders
home address, work address, physical characteristics, a photograph, fingerprints,
and a description of the sex offenses. Id.
" MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178K(2)(b)(1997).
Section 178K(2)(a)
provides:
If the risk of offense is moderate, a level two designation shall be
given to the sex offender. In such case, the board shall transmit the
registration data to the police departments where the sex offender intends to live and wbrk and where the offense was committed and to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. A level two community notification
plan shall require the police department to notify organizations in the
community which are likely to encounter the offender including, but
not limited to, schools, day care centers, religious and youth organizations, and sports leagues.
Id.
"' See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178K(2)(a)(1997) (requiring notification
to community organizations "likely to encounter" sex offender).
52 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178K(2)(c)(1997) (setting forth required
community notification scheme).
49

"

See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178K(2)(b)(1997) (requiring level three

sex offenders not only to notify organizations in community which are "likely to
encounter" sex offender, but also notify individual members of public).
' See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178K (1) (a) (1997) (articulating factors
used to determine risk).
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Although somewhat conclusive, a level two or a level three offender has the right to challenge their risk designation.5 Level one
offenders, however, do not have the right to challenge their risk
56
designation. Proponents of the statute have argued that level one
offenders, because of the relaxed community notification schemes,
do not enjoy a statutory right to judicial review. 7 Since the enactment of the sex offender registry legislation, much controversy has
surrounded a level one offender's due process right to introduce evidence to show that the offender is not a threat to minors or other
vulnerable people. Moreover, because the sex offender registry's
purpose is to protect minors or other vulnerable people from falling
prey and becoming sex victims, some level one offenders have
claimed that the registration notification plan is overinclusive when
the crime committed does not involve children.
In Doe v. Criminal History Sys. Bd.,6° the Superior Court of

Massachusetts was required to determine whether a plaintiff was entitled to injunctive relief from the Act. 6' The sixteen year old plain-

" MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178M (1997) provides in pertinent part,
[a]n offender who has been given a level two or three designation may
petition the superior court where the offender resides or intends to reside to challenge his risk designation. Such offender may request an
opportunity to appear and be heard. At such hearing, the rules of evidence shall not apply and the court may review any materials described in the guidelines.
Id. This section allows the sex registry board to modify the designation given to
a particular offender if it was determined that such classification was an abuse of
discretion. Id. The chance to challenge the risk classification, however, is not
given to level one offenders. Id.
" See id. (acknowledging no review for offenders classified as level one).
" See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178K(3) (1997) (announcing level one
classifications are final).
58

See Doe v. Attorney General (No.2), 425 Mass. 217, 680 N.E.2d 97

(1997) (finding some sections of sex offender registry overinclusive).

" See id. (acknowledging person convicted of crime of open and gross
lewdness may not be threat to public).
60
61

No. 96- 6046, 1997 WL 100878 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 1997).

Id. at * 1.
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tiff was convicted of raping a child under sixteen. 62 The plaintiff
served nine months probation for his conviction. 63 The plaintiff
could have been classified as a level one offender because he had not
received a risk classification due to his lack of a criminal record
since the delinquency.64 The plaintiff contended the application of
the sex offender registry unconstitutionally restricted his right to due
process. 65 The court, while examining the Act, reiterated the legislative intent of the Act is to protect the public from repeat sex offenders, and to provide law enforcement agencies with the necessary information to prevent sexual victimization.6
The court announced
that the procedural due process available to level two and level three
offenders is to challenge their risk classification. 67 Level one offenders, however, may not challenge their classification because they are
already at the lowest level. 6' The court further found there is no provision in the Act that allows a level one offender to challenge
whether he must register at all. 69 The Act's juvenile registration re62

Id. The plaintiff admitted to sufficient facts for the court to warrant a

charge of one count of being a delinquent child by reason of raping of a child
younger than sixteen under section two hundred and sixty-five section twentytwo A in 1986. Id.
63 Id.
64 See Criminal History Sys. Bd., 1997 WL 100878, at *3 (assuming lack
of criminal record since delinquency will require level one classification).
65 See id. at *7 (arguing level one offenders are not given opportunity to
challenge whether offender should be required to register at all). The Court,
however, holds that the right to appeal is available only to challenge one's
classification within the sex offender registry, and not, as the plaintiff argues, to
challenge whether one must register at all. Id. Therefore, if one is given a level
one classification, no appellate review is possible. Id.
See id. (reciting purpose of sex offender registry act); see also Opinion
of the Justices, 423 Mass. 1201, 668 N.E.2d 738 (1996) (examining purpose and
intent of proposed sex offender registry act).
67 See Criminal History Sys. Bd., 1997 WL 100878, at *7 (acknowledging
that right to judicial review is limited to review of risk designation).
68
See id. (acknowledging appellate review granted only to challenge
one's level determination).
69 See id. (reasoning sex offender already classified at lowest level- level
one).
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quirement illustrates the legislature's intent to "create broad coverage. ' ' 70 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts denied the
plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction.7 '
In Doe v. Attorney General (No.2),72 the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the
plaintiff's sex offender registry information from being made public. 73 In Doe (No. 2), the adult plaintiff was twice convicted of the
crime of open and gross lewdness.74 The plaintiff contested § 1781
of the Act claiming that the purpose of the registry is to protect vulnerable people from becoming sex victims and therefore the registry,
as applied to him, would serve no legitimate purpose. 75 The plaintiff
further contended the furnishing of this material to the public for the
crime of open and gross lewdness would be punitive.76 The trial
judge granted the preliminary injunction, and the court had to determine whether the judge used the "proper legal standards." 77 The
court held the "weakness of section 1781 as a remedial measure is
revealed by comparing it to the provisions of section 178J." 78 The

70

Id. at *4; but see Doe v. Weld, 954 F. Supp 425, 433 (D. Mass. 1996)

(citing Rep. Paulsen expressing concern there is no language concerning
juveniles).
" Criminal History Sys. Bd., 1997 WL 100878, at *8.
72 425 Mass. 217, 680 N.E.2d 97
(1997).
" Id.; 680 N.E.2d at 97.
Id. at 218, 680 N.E.2d at 98. In 1989, the plaintiff was convicted of
masturbating in a public department store. Id. The 1995 conviction occurred as
a result of the plaintiff being caught masturbating while driving on a public
highway. Id.
" See Doe (No. 2), 425 Mass. at 218, 680 N.E.2d at 98; see also MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 1781 which states, in relevant part: "Any person who is
eighteen years of age or older, upon the verification of his age and identity, shall
receive at no cost from the board a report which indicates whether an individual
identified by name, date of birth or sufficient personal identifying characteristics
is a sex offender... " Id.
76 Doe (No. 2), 425 Mass. at 219, 680 N.E.2d at
98.
Id. at 219, 680 N.E.2d at 98.
78 Id. at 220, 680 N.E.2d at 99. Section 178J explicitly requires that a
person requesting the information need it for "his own protection or for the
74
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Court found that section 1781, as applied to the plaintiff, was over
inclusive and provided no remedial purpose. 79
In the prior case of Doe v. Weld, 0 a juvenile sex offender
brought an action challenging the registration and disclosure requirements of Massachusetts sex offender registry."1 The sex offender argued the registration scheme strips juveniles of their anonymity and is too extensive as applied to juveniles.82 In addition, the
plaintiff argued the retroactive application violated his constitutional
rights.83 The plaintiff, nearly two years before the sex offender registry was enacted, plead guilty as a minor to four counts of indecent
assault and battery on a child under fourteen years old.
The plaintiff served four months probation and was not subsequently convicted of any crime since his probation has ended.85 After the enactment of the Act, the plaintiff was informed of his obligation to
register.86 The plaintiff filed a temporary restraining order for a preliminary injunction arguing that at the time he was sentenced, Massachusetts law expressly prohibited public inspection of juveniles

protection of a child under the age of eighteen or another person for whom said
inquirer has responsibility, care or custody." MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178J
(1997). Section 1781, however, makes no such reference. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
6, § 1781(1997).
79Doe(No.2), 425 Mass. at 221, 680 N.E.2d at 99; see also supra note 75
and accompanying text (announcing proper procedure to find out whether
particular person is sex offender).
80 954 F. Supp. 425 (D. Mass. 1996).
See id. (arguing Act too broad as applied to juveniles).
82 See id. at 435 (reiterating argument Act is too broad).
See id. at 426 (arguing Act violates ex post facto, bill of attainder,
double jeopardy and due process clauses).
See Weld, 954 F. Supp. at 429 (describing plaintiff's criminal history).
" See id. at 428 (noting minor did not commit any subsequent crime).
6 Id. at 429.
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records. s7 The Court, however, denied the plaintiff's motion on several grounds.8"
The United States District Court in Doe v. Weld concluded that
the level one notification plan as set forth in the sex offender registry
act has a number of procedural safeguards. 9 The Doe court also
found a rational connection between requiring juvenile sex offenders
to register under the level one scheme and the purpose of the sex offender registry. 90 This court held that the effect of the public interest
in having the juvenile register greatly outweighed the risk that the
juvenile may suffer irreparable injury. 9' The intent of the sex offender registry prevailed over the juvenile's potential for injury.92
The court in Weld further held the inclusion of juveniles in the Act
illustrates the desire of the legislature to protect people that are vulnerable from becoming a sex crime victim. 93 This decision sent a

87

Id.; see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 60A (defining when juveniles

records are open for public inspection).
88 See Weld, 954 F. Supp. at 425.

The court denied the preliminary

injunction because the "juvenile did not show the likelihood of success on claim
that requirements [of registering] amounted to punishment for purposes of ex post
facto, bill of attainder, and double jeopardy clauses." Id.
89 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178J (1997) (listing requirements for
person requesting sex offender information).
90 See Weld, 954 F. Supp. at 436 (holding treatment of juvenile sex
offenders had rational basis).
"' See id. at 432 (acknowledging inclusion of juveniles in Act illustrates
broad desire to protect vulnerable people).
92 See id. at 433 (reiterating legislature's intent was
to protect vulnerable
people from becoming sex crime victim). The Massachusetts legislature "desired
to assist law enforcement officials in the prevention and investigation of sex
crimes and, when necessary, to 'allow particular members of the public who are
in an especially vulnerable situation ... to take measures lawfully available to
them to protect themselves against danger."' Id. (quoting Opinion of the Justices,
423 Mass. at 1227, 668 N.E.2d at 752 (1996)).
"' See Weld, 954 F. Supp. at 433 (balancing juveniles right for potential
injury against the public's).
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message to the public
that Massachusetts is serious about protecting
94
potential victims.

In the subsequent case of Poe v. Attorney General," the Massachusetts Superior Court held that the Board may not distribute information about sex offenders prior to a judicial review. 96 The court
acknowledged that the Act does not explicitly provide for a "dissemination stay pending judicial review." 97 The court interpreted the
Act's legislative intent to mean that all information must be kept
confidential prior to a judicial review. 9 The court, in looking to the
other sections of the statute and the devastating consequences that
public disclosure could have, granted the plaintiffs' request for a
preliminary injunction. 99

See id. (holding registration information of juveniles subject to public
disclosure).
9' No. 96-6237-B, 1996 WL 754895 (Mass. Super. Dec. 19, 1996).
96 Id. at * 1. In Poe, the two plaintiffs argued the Act should
require that
no information may be given to the public for level two or level three offenders
prior to a judicial review of the classification. Id. at *2. The registration and
notice procedures that the Board will follow are:
1. Persons who have been registered as sexual offenders will be mailed
a letter notifying them of the pending classification by the Board; 2.
[t]he individual may submit materials to the Board within twenty days
of the date of the letter; 3. [a]fter the Board makes its classification decision, the individual will be notified by certified mail of the decision;
4. [d]issemination will not commence until fourteen days after the
registrant receives the letter or until the Postal Service has returned the
letter to the Board as undelivered; 5. [n]o stay will be given to any person who seeks judicial review, as the Boards decision is 'presumptively valid.'
Id.
9 See Poe at *4 (noting although statute does not explicitly provide for
dissemination, it is reasonable to infer based upon likelihood of harm).
98 See id. (observing requirements of other sections of legislation as
requiring confidentiality).
9" See id. (stressing 178M of the act); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, §
178M (1997) providing, in relevant part:
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In the recent case Doe(]), the level one offender claimed the Act
failed to provide him with a hearing and therefore failed to find he
presented a risk to children or other vulnerable persons for whose
protection the legislation was adopted.'0° In Doe(]), the offender
plead guilty to one count of indecent assault and battery on an undercover police officer and was placed on probation for two years."'
The offender asserted his "sexual interests are exclusively oriented
to other consenting adults.",02 The offender claimed he should only

be made to register after he had a hearing and it was determined that
he was a threat. °3 The Supreme Judicial Court concluded the requirement and notification provisions were unconstitutional as applied to the offender at a level one classification when no determina-

An offender who has been given a level two or level three designation
may petition the superior court where the offender resides or intends to
reside to challenge his risk designation... The court may modify the
risk designation given by the sex offender registry board only if such
designation is arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. The court shall reach its final decision within sixty days of the offender's petition for review. The court
shall keep proceedings conducted pursuant to this paragraph and records from such proceedings confidential.
Id. (emphasis added).
0 Poe, 1996 WL 754895, at *4.
'"1Id. The offender was found in a wooded lot bordering a highway rest
area which was known for consensual homosexual activity. Id. The offender had
approached an undercover police officer and placed his hand inside the police
officer's front pocket and squeezed. Id. The offender then was placed under
arrest. Id.
'02 Doe, 1997 WL 709859, at *1. The offender had been convicted in
1989 for a similar act. Id. The offender claimed his sexual activity with a
consenting adult is distinguishable from what the sex offender act proscribes. Id.
at 2. The offender asserted that he was a self employed carpenter and if he was
made to register he would lose most, if not all, of his customers and friends. Id.
'0' Id. "Plaintiff argues that neither the manner in which he committed the
crime of indecent assault and battery, nor any other circumstance, justifies the
conclusion that he is a threat to anyone, and particularly to children or to any
other non consenting potential victim of a sex crime." Id.
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tion had been made concerning the offenders threat, if any, to minors
and other vulnerable people for whom the act was passed.'"
III. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Doe (No.2) acknowledges the loopholes of the Act, and the possibility of sex offender registry information being used for purposes other than protection.' °5 Doe (No.2) provided that not all offenses defined as a
"sex offense" should require registration.' °6 The subsequent decision in Doe (1) has left proponents of the two year old Act thinking
it is time to go back to the drawing board.' °7 The overbroad risk
classifications have included people that pose no risk to minor children or other vulnerable people, but are still considered sex offenders
within the meaning of the statute. '08 Crimes which by their nature
pose no threat to minor children or other vulnerable people may not
warrant registration.

,4 See id. at *6 (maintaining there must be hearing to assess whether
offender poses risk).
05 See Doe (No.2), 425 Mass. 217, 680 N.E.2d 97 (realizing registration
of certain sex offenses may not serve any remedial purpose to public).
106 See id., supra note 58 (acknowledging not all sex offenses may create
threat to vulnerable people).
,0' See e.g., John Ellement et. al., Sex Case Registry Weakened by SIC,
Boston Globe, Nov. 18, 1997, at Al (observing Supreme Judicial Court has left
current law unworkable); Matt Kelly, Sex Offender Ruling Weakens Registry
Law, Patriot Ledger, Nov. 18, 1997, at Al. (noting decision dealt "strong blow"
to new law); John H. Boit, Sex Registry Ruling Bolsters Hopes for Lifetime
ParoleBill, Patriot Ledger, Nov. 19, 1997, at AI (advocating proposal of lifetime
parole for sex offenders may gain more support since SJC weakened registry
law).
108 See Doe, 1997 WL 709859, at * 1 (recognizing some crimes
characterized as sex offenses do not pose threat to vulnerable people).
,09 425 Mass. at 221, 680 N.E.2d at 99 (recognizing certain crimes more
serious than others).
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These holdings illustrate an emerging shift in the existing sex
offender registry law." 0 The holding in Doe(]) may open the door
for more than thirteen thousand new hearings for level one offenders."' The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reasoned in
Doe(]) that the primary purpose for enacting the sex offender registry was to protect those who were vulnerable from becoming a victim of a sex crime." 2 Absent a showing that the offender poses some
threat to the community, disclosure of the information would serve
no legitimate purpose." 3 Although the crimes committed under
Doe(]) require registration in the sex offender registry, the court for
the first time, acknowledged that a plaintiff has the right to rebut the
presumption that he is not a threat to the community."' The court
has opened the floodgates." 5
Judicial decisions holding that the Act fails to provide appropriate procedural due process to level one offenders leaves the state of
the law unclear."16 The court acknowledged that the disclosure of an
offenders crime varies with the level of risk that the offender
poses." 7 The court's focus, however, is on what happens when the
"o See supra note 107 and accompanying text (observing recent case law
damaged Act).
"' See Doe, 1997 WL 709859, at *6 (acknowledging right to hearing to
determine risk of sex offender to vulnerable people).
..
2 See id. (reiterating purpose of Act); see also Opinion of the Justices,
423 Mass. 1201, 668 N.E.2d 738 (1996) (characterizing sex offender registry as a
remedial measure to protect potential victims). The court further acknowledged
that the Act, as applied to the plaintiff, would serve no remedial purpose. Doe,
1997 WL 709859, at *3.
"' Doe, 1997 WL 709859, at *4.
"4 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178C (1997) (defining
what constitutes
sex offense); see also Doe, 1997 WL 709859, at * 1 (admitting offender's right to
hearing).
"' See supra note 107 and accompanying text (acknowledging court has
weakened sex offender law).
116
See Doe, 1997 WL 709859, at *4 (noting current law as applied to
level one offender is unworkable).
. See id. at *2 (affirming disclosure varies with risk that offender will reoffend).
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level one offender is not given an opportunity to show that he is not
a risk at all."' The case law suggests that absent a showing of risk to
the community, registration may not be warranted." 9
IV. CONCLUSION
Prior to Doe v. Attorney General(]), level one offenders were
not provided any procedural due process to determine whether they
presented any risk to vulnerable people for whose protection the Act
was adopted. The Supreme Judicial Court's recent pronouncement
that the Act is unconstitutional as applied to low-level risk offenders
has left the current law unclear and unworkable. The Sex Offender
Registry Act was enacted to provide the public with information
about known sex offenders. The court, however, has disregarded the
purpose of the Act. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
has given known sex offenders more rights than the victims and potential victims.
The well-known saying, "[y]ou do the crime, you pay the
time," has little meaning after this decision. All level one sex offenders have committed a crime, a crime they claim should not require registration until after a hearing. The question the court must
ask itself, is how should we reconcile the imposition of requiring sex
offenders' to register with the need to protect the public?
In our society, we have enacted laws for people to follow to
keep our communities safe. When someone breaks a law they
should be punished. Allowing over thirteen thousand new hearings
for level one offenders to assess the risk they pose to society will
impede not only the purpose of the Act, but also hinder law enforcement agencies in their obligation to keep our communities safe.
The level one offenders' argument that the Act is overinclusive
and therefore unconstitutional has little strength. The Act specifically

" See id. at *5 (announcing Act offers no procedure for determining if
person is risk to community).
"9
See supra note 104 and accompanying text (recognizing need for
hearing to determine whether threat exists).
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lays out what will constitute a sex offense. The offenders have notice that any of the proscribed acts will require registration. In addition, the community notification schemes for level one offenders requires only that the offenders register with their local police departments. The information is not given to the public unless the public
specifically inquires about that individual.
The sex offender registry was implemented to protect the public,
not to protect an offender. The public has a right to know when
someone in their community poses a risk to loved ones when they
inquire about that particular offender. The argument that the law is
overinclusive overlooks the entire purpose and intent of the Act.
Nicole Marie Nigrelli

